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Abstract. We address the problem of how cooperative (altruistic-like) behavior
arises in natural and social systems by analyzing an ultimatum game in complex
networks. Specifically, three types of players are considered: (a) empathetic, whose
aspiration level and offer are equal, (b) pragmatic, who do not distinguish between the
different roles and aim to obtain the same benefit, and (c) agents whose aspiration level
and offer are independent. We analyze the asymptotic behavior of pure populations
on different topologies using two kinds of strategic update rules. Natural selection,
which relies on replicator dynamics, and Social Penalty, inspired in the Bak-Sneppen
dynamics, in which players are subjected to a social selection rule penalizing not only
the less fitted individuals, but also their first neighbors. We discuss the emergence of
fairness in the different settings and network topologies.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Kg, 87.23.Ge, 89.75.Fb
Keywords : Network dynamics, Collective phenomena in economic and social systems
1. Introduction
Human cooperation has been the focus of intense debate within the theoretical
framework of evolutionary theories since long time ago [1, 2]. In particular, altruistic
behavior, in which individuals perform costly acts for themselves to confer benefits to
the rest of the population, has often been identified as a key mechanism for cooperation.
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A number of theoretical approaches have been developed to explain the emergence of
human altruism. Kin selection theory [3] accounts for situations in which it pays off
(inclusive fitness) to help relatives that share some fraction of the genetic pool. In
the absence of such kin relationships, repeated interactions have also been shown to
lead to cooperation, as well as different kinds of reciprocity mechanisms [2, 4, 5, 6].
Recently, a series of behavioral experiments in which interactions are anonymous and
one-shot have shown that humans can punish non-cooperators (altruistic punishment)
and reward those individuals who cooperate (altruistic rewarding) [2, 7, 8, 9, 10]. This
so-called strong reciprocity can actually explain the observed cooperative behavior in
terms of group and cultural selection. However, standard evolutionary game theory is
still far from explaining how cooperation may arise from selection at the individual level.
Recent steps in this direction [11] have contributed to fill this gap, although a general
theoretical framework is still needed.
On the other hand, recent discoveries on the architecture of biological, technological
and social systems have shown that the structure of these systems has important
consequences on their dynamical behavior [12, 13]. In particular, the dynamical features
observed in heterogeneous, scale-free networks, are radically different from those in
homogenous networks. This difference is due to the presence of highly connected nodes.
For instance, in epidemic spreading, the hubs are very efficient in propagating the disease
[14, 15], up to the point that in heterogeneous networks the epidemic threshold vanishes
in the limit of infinite system size. In some other processes, the hubs play the opposite
role. An example is rumor spreading [16], where a larger number of ”infected” nodes
is obtained in homogeneous networks. Finally, there are situations where hubs play a
more subtle role. This is the case of synchronization phenomena [17]. In many systems,
scale-free (SF) networks exhibit a smaller threshold for the onset of synchronization.
Nonetheless, the stability of the fully synchronized state is less robust in SF networks
than in random graphs.
Motivated by the aforementioned results, studies of evolutionary game theory
models on hetereogenous networks have attracted much attention in the last years
[6, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24]. Issues such as the influence of the social structure in
cooperative behavior, as well as the role of the highly connected nodes have been mainly
explored in the context of the Prisoner’s Dilemma [19, 20, 21, 23]. The results obtained
point out that SF networks are best suited to support cooperation and that hubs play a
fundamental role in spreading cooperation through a positive feedback mechanism, even
when it is expensive. The same kind of results have been recently reported for public
good games [25].
Here we focus on the Ultimatum Game (UG), another kind of game extensively used
to model altruistic behavior [26], but not adequately explored in the context of complex
networks, though spatial effects have been considered to some extent (see for instance
[27] for the UG model on regular 1D and 2D lattices). The standard UG considers
that two players bargain to divide a fixed reward between them. Suppose that one of
these players acts as proposer offering a division of the reward. The other, henceforth
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called respondent, can accept or reject this proposal, but cannot counteroffer. If the
respondent accepts, the reward is divided as agreed, otherwise both receive nothing.
For a one-shot game played anonymously, the rational solution (subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium solution) is that in which the proposer would offer the smallest possible
share and the respondent would accept it. However, plenty of experimental results
point out that the rational solution is not what actually happens. For instance in the
social context, it has been shown that the mean offer is usually between 40% and 50%
and that offers below 20% of the reward are often rejected [28, 29]. This has been
interpreted as an example of altruistic punishment [7, 10], i.e., the tendence to impose
sanctions on unfair individuals with a cost for the punisher. However, costly punishment
has been proven [30] to be maladaptive (winners do not punish) which leaves open the
question on how this trait has evolved.
We implement here two kinds of evolution rules (see below): one is fitness-dependent
and is based on a pairwise comparison, in the spirit of [21, 23], and the second one is
inspired in the Bak-Sneppen model [31, 32, 33] of punctuated equilibrium. Summing
up, in the present work, we study an UG model on Erdo¨s-Re´nyi and Scale-free networks
with three different kinds of settings of the parameters characterizing the players. The
asymptotic evolutionary states reached following the two update rules cited above are
analyzed and compared in the three different frameworks.
2. The model
In our model we consider N individuals associated to the nodes of a graph. The graph
topologies we will study are of two different kinds: Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (ER) and Scale-free
(SF) networks. An ER network is characterized by a degree distribution that decays
exponentially fast for large k, while in a SF network the degree distribution follows a
power-law of the form Pk ∼ k
−γ . We consider SF networks with γ ≈ 3 [34]. Therefore,
while in ER networks the number of contacts shared by individuals shows a finite
variance, in SF networks we find nodes, usually referred to as hubs, that interact with
a large fraction of the population.
2.1. Playing the Ultimatum Game
The individuals on the nodes of the aforementioned networks play the Ultimatum Game
(UG). At each time step, each individual plays a round robin of the game with all his
neighbors, as dictated by the graph. In each round, individuals play the UG twice with
each neighbor, both as proposers and as respondents. The reward to divide in each of
these two games is equal to 1. An individual i (i = 1, ..., N) is characterized by two
parameters: pi, qi ∈ [0, 1]. When i acts as proposer it offers a division pi of the reward,
so that the respondent will earn pi if the proposal is accepted. Instead, when agent i
plays as respondent, it will accept only offers larger than its acceptance threshold qi.
Therefore, when two individuals (i, j) bargain, their payoffs, Πi and Πj, evolve according
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to the following rules:
• Player i offers the amount pi to j. If pi ≥ qj , the offer is accepted and the payoff of
i and j are incremented by ∆ΠOij = (1−pi) and ∆Π
R
ji = pi respectively. Conversely,
if pi < qj , agreement is not possible and both players get nothing and their payoffs
remain the same, ∆ΠOij = ∆Π
R
ji = 0.
• When player i is the respondent, the same rules apply. Therefore, upon agreement
(pj > qi), players i and j increase their payoffs by ∆Π
R
ij = pj and ∆Π
O
ji = (1 − pj)
respectively.
The final payoffs of a node i after playing with all its neighbors is
Πi =
∑
l∈Γi
(∆ΠOil +∆Π
R
il ) , (1)
where Γi denotes the set of i’s neighbors.
In the following, we will study three different settings for the values of the
parameters pi and qi:
(A) For each agent i, pi = qi [35]. This is usually called a fair or empathetic setting
since each agent offers the same reward it is disposed to accept;
(B) For each agent i, pi = 1− qi [36]. This is a role-ignoring or pragmatic setting since
each agent wants to get the same reward both as respondent and as proposer;
(C) The values of pi and qi are independent for each agent.
The second choice B stands for a situation in which players do not differentiate
between roles (role-ignoring agents). In other words, regardless of whether they act
as proposers or responders, they are determined to obtain a fixed quantity from each
interaction, so that qi = 1 − pi [36]. This situation is in contrast with the case of an
empathetic or fair and role-distinguishing setting A, according to which individuals do
distinguish among roles. In this case the threshold of acceptance is set equal to the
one for proposals (qi = pi), so as to get half of the total stake on average. Finally, in
the third setting C the quantity offered and the threshold of acceptance are completely
independent as in the original formulation of the UG.
Note, that in both cases A and B, the corresponding relations p(q) allow to obtain
simple rules for the conclusion of a deal between two players. Given that the offer pi
proposed by player i is accepted by j only if pi ≥ qj we have the two following scenarios:
(A) Case p = q: if pi 6= pj i and j always conclude a deal, but only in one of the two
directions. In particular, the accepted offer is the largest one: max{pi, pj}. If for
example pi > pj, the payoffs are incremented by:
∆Πij = ∆Π
O
ij = 1− pi , (2)
∆Πji = ∆Π
R
ji = pi . (3)
If pi = pj the deal is concluded in both directions and their payoffs are incremented
in ∆Πij = ∆Πji = 1, which is the maximum possible reward after the interaction
between two players of type A.
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(B) Case p = 1 − q: both players i and j will obtain reward both as proposers and
respondents if the condition pi + pj ≥ 1 is verified. In this case, their payoffs are
incremented by
∆Πij = ∆Π
O
ij +∆Π
R
ij = (1− pi) + pj , (4)
∆Πji = ∆Π
O
ji +∆Π
R
ji = (1− pj) + pi . (5)
When pi + pj < 1 no payoff is obtained in the round.
We illustrate the different ordering in payoffs for the two type of players in Figure
1.
2.2. Updating the strategies
Once a player has bargained with all its neighbors, the accumulated payoff drives the
update of their strategies. This update process takes place at the individual level, in
the same spirit of [11], and follows two different schemes:
• Natural selection: In this framework, originally introduced in [37, 38], each player
i in the network selects at random one neighbor j and compares its payoff Πi with
the one of j, Πj . If Πj > Πi, player i adopts the strategy of j, (pj, qj), for the next
round of the UG with a probability proportional to the payoff difference:
Pij =
Πj − Πi
2max{ki, kj}
. (6)
where ki and kj are the degrees of i and j respectively. Instead, if Πi ≤ Πj , i keeps
his strategy for the following round.
• Social penalty: The player with lowest payoff in the whole population together with
its neighbors, no matter how wealthy they are, are removed. These agents are
replaced in their nodes by new players with random strategies (so that they only
inherit their contacts).
In the case of Natural selection, there is a pairwise comparison thanks to which fittest
strategies are replicated with a rate proportional to their success, with the result of
eventually spreading over the whole population [21]. As we will discuss, these dominant
strategies might not promote the welfare of the population since it acts at a local level.
On the contrary, Social penalty acts at the global level; the removal of all the neighbors
of the least-fitted agent is a catastrophic effect triggered by his extinction (see [31] for
a discussion on the evolutionary justification of this updating rule) and not related to
individuals’ fitness but to the network of interactions. This undiscriminating (and likely
unfair) social penalty is imposed on those agents that in the community are responsible
for the low fitness of the dying agent; thus it is quite different from the current notion
of (altruistic) punishment commented above. With this evolutionary rule, a player, in
order to survive, has to take care not only of his payoff, but also of the neighbors’ one: if
an individual exploits its neighborhood so that it takes a large stake of the total reward,
it would risk to be dropped out of the game as a result of one of its neighbors being
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>Π jΠi >Π jΠi
>ΠΠj i
>ΠΠj iΠi
jΠ
=0
=0
Πi
jΠ
=0
=0
>ΠΠj i
>Π jΠi
>ΠΠj i
>Π jΠi
(B) p=1−q(A) p=q
Figure 1. The figures show the partition of the strategies space of a two UG players (i
and j) into different regions. Each of these regions is labelled according to the payoffs
ordering: green areas correspond to the case Πi > Πj , blue areas to Πj > Πi. The
regions in white correspond to the case of a zero reward for both players Πi = Πj = 0.
(See text for the details).
that with the lowest payoff in the population of players. In both the Social penalty and
Natural selection contexts, after the implementation of the update rule, the payoffs of
the agents are reset to zero. This means that players have no memory of the previous
round payoffs, although they keep their strategies; consequently it is a one-shot game
and no mechanism of reputation has been explicitly introduced [36].
In the following, we will analyze the scenarios concerning these two updating rules
in ER and SF topologies for the three strategic settings A, B and C introduced above.
3. The Ultimatum game with Natural selection
The behavior of players of type A (empathetic) and B (pragmatic) can be easily
predicted in a well-mixed population when a replicator-like dynamics is at work. Because
of this, in the following two subsections we will first discuss the evolution of the game
in a well-mixed population and then compare it with the numerical results obtained for
homogeneous and heterogeneous networks.
3.1. Networks of type A players (p = q)
As mentioned above, in a round robin between two empathetic (q = p) players i and j
the largest offer, say pi, is always accepted by the player offering less, hence j, and the
payoff obtained will be those of eqs. (2) and (3). In the case of pi > pj, two situations
are possible: (i) pi > 0.5, so that Πj > Πi and (ii) pi < 0.5, yielding Πi > Πj (see Figure
1.a).
In the case of the dynamics of a well-mixed population where all the individuals
interact with the rest of the players, given the distribution D(p) of offers in the
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population one finds that the payoff received by strategist offering x is Π(x) =
G(x) + 〈p〉 −H(x) where:
G(x) = (1− x)
∫ x
0
D(p)dp , (7)
H(x) =
∫ x
0
pD(p)dp , (8)
〈p〉 =
∫
1
0
pD(p)dp . (9)
In the case of replicator dynamics, the increase or decrease of the fraction of players
using strategy x is determined by Π(x) − 〈Π〉, being 〈Π〉 the average payoff in the
population. For a uniform distribution D(p) = 1 one obtains Π(x) − 〈Π〉 = x − 3x2/2
and one concludes that from an initial uniform distribution the highest values of p will
soon become extinct, and the highest increase in frequency will occur for values centered
at x = 1/3. Once most of players use offers below 1/2, the selective advantage is for
players with higher p (below 1/2). Thus, one expects that the values of p will concentrate
at p = 1/2. This two stage dynamics will be obtained also in the context of complex
networks.
We show the results obtained with this dynamics on top of ER and SF networks.
In both cases the networks have N = 104 nodes and average degree 〈k〉 = 4. The
evolutionary dynamics starts assigning to each individual of the population a random
offer pi (and thus pi = qi) uniformly distributed in the interval [0, 1]. Then, we follow
the system evolution for a number of time steps until a stationary regime is reached.
The results presented are averaged over at least 103 realizations of both the underlying
network and the initial conditions.
Figures 2.a and 2.b show the time evolution of the distribution of offers D(p) in
the population for both ER and SF networks. It is evident that for ER networks the
distribution D(p) after t = 2 · 104 generations shows qualitatively the shape predicted
using the well-mixed assumption. Moreover, the two-stage evolution explained above is
also confirmed by looking at the time evolution of D(p). From t = 1 to t = 102 the
strategists with p > 0.5 are removed and invaded by those players with low values of p.
After this initial stage, the flow of strategies goes from low values of p towards p = 0.5,
reaching the final distribution peaked at p ≃ 0.5 with a fast decaying tail at p < 0.5.
In the case of SF networks the asymptotic distribution of offers D(p) becomes
broader with respect to ER graphs. Remarkably the two-stage process is also observed
since most of strategies with large values of p are removed in the first time steps. On
the other hand, at variance with ER networks, some strategies with p > 0.5 survive
in the final population. This result is the consequence of having individuals, named
hubs, with large degree kh > 〈k〉. The analysis of a “coarse grained” picture of degree-
homogeneous population of size N and mean degree 〈k〉 with an individual connected
to a large number, kh, of individuals of this population can help us to understand
what takes place for SF networks. Suppose that the population has reached its internal
equilibrium and therefore pi ≃ 0.5 for all its members. In the case ph < 0.5 (selfish hubs),
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(d) SF p = 1− q
Figure 2. Distribution of offers D(p) for ER and SF networks in the cases p = q [(a)
and (b)] and p = 1− q [(c) and (d)] when a Replicator-like update rule, eq. (6), is at
work.
a hub obtains a payoff Πh = kh/2 while the members of the population connected to
the hub obtains Πi = 〈k〉 + 1/2. In this case, the hub survives (i.e. satisfies Πh ≥ Πi)
for every value ph < 0.5 provided that kh ≥ 2〈k〉 + 1, a condition that is easily verified
in SF for large degree nodes. On the other hand, if ph > 0.5 (generous hubs) we have
Πh = kh(1 − ph) and on average 〈Π〉 = 〈k〉 + ph for the individuals connected to the
hub. Therefore, if generous hubs are to survive in the system they cannot offer more
than ph ≤ (1− 〈k〉/kh). This maximum offer tend to 1 as kh grows, thus explaining the
existence of a tail for p > 0.5 in the distribution D(p) of SF networks. In both cases, the
strategy of hubs is eventually replicated by the rest of the population and after enough
generations the payoff of the hub is Πh = kh while 〈Π〉 = 〈k〉 for its neighbors. Hence,
heterogeneity can help the fixation of altruistic behavior in nodes provided they have a
large number of contacts to obtain enough payoff.
3.2. Networks of type B players (p = 1− q)
Let’s now focus on the case B. In this context, two players i and j conclude a deal only
when pi+pj ≥ 1. If this condition holds, the consensus is automatically reached in both
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directions, and the payoffs of the players are those specified in eqs. (4) and (5). The line
(see Figure 1.b) pi = 1 − pj delimitates the area of unsuccessful strategies (below the
line), since no payoff is obtained, from that of the successful ones (above the line). This
latter region can be further divided into two triangular areas: that of pi > pj, yielding
Πj > Πi, and the one of pj > pi, giving Πi > Πj. Obviously, the border between the
two regions is specified by pi = pj (see Figure 1.b).
For a well mixed with a distribution density of offers D(p), the payoff of strategist
x is Π(x) = G′(x) +H ′(x) where:
G′(x) = (1− x)
∫
1
1−x
D(p)dp , (10)
H ′(x) =
∫
1
1−x
pD(p)dp . (11)
For an initial uniform density D(p) = 1, one obtains Π(x)− 〈Π〉 = −3x2/2 + 2x− 1/2
whose graph is mirror-symmetric around x = 1/2 of the one obtained for type A players.
Thus, one expects a fast extinction of lowest offers and an initially higher growth of
offers around 2/3. Once offers below 1/2 become extinct, one easily realizes that for
any arbitrary corresponding density (D(p) = 0 for p < 1/2), Π(x) − 〈Π〉 = 〈p〉 − x so
that the selective advantage is for offers as close to p = 1/2 as possible. Therefore one
expects a progressive displacement to p = 1/2 values of the maximum of the evolving
density.
When performing simulations of B players on ER networks, similarly to what
happens for A players (see 3.1), the asymptotic distribution of offers agrees with the
well-mixed predictions, as Figure 2.c confirms. Here the distribution at t = 2 · 104
shows a peak at p = 0.5 and a fast decaying tail for p > 0.5. This tail proves that
strategies moves towards p = 0.5 from the right, i.e. from the successful region of the
N -dimensional space. Remarkably, the strategies with p < 0.5 are totally removed from
the population already at t = 100.
The distribution of offers D(p) in SF networks, Figure 2.d, shows also a peak around
p = 0.5 but with a tail for p > 0.5 decreasing slower than in ER networks. This behavior
can be explained again with the presence of highly connected players. Following the same
argument used for A players, a hub with an offer ph > 0.5, connected to a large number
kh of individuals with p ≃ 0.5 and mean degree 〈k〉, obtains a payoff Πh = kh(3/2− ph)
whereas for the individuals connected to the hub on average 〈Π〉 = 〈k〉 + ph + 1/2. In
this setting, the hub will survive and spread its strategy provided ph ≤ (3/2− 〈k〉/kh).
Therefore offers of hubs can also reach p = 1 as observed in the distribution D(p)
for SF networks. Similarly as in the case of type A players, once the hub’s neighbors
have imitated its strategy the payoffs of the hub and its neighbors are Πh = kh while
〈Π〉 = 〈k〉 respectively. In the case ph < 0.5, since the condition ph+ pi ≥ 1 is no longer
verified, the region with p < 0.5 keeps on being forbidden, in agreement with the sharp
decay of D(p) in Figure 2.d.
Interestingly, at variance with the case of type A players in which the unsuccessful
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Figure 3. The distributions of offers D(p) [(a) and (b)] and of acceptance thresholds
D(q) [(c) and (d)] for ER [(a) and (c)] and SF [(b) and (d)] networks when a Replicator-
like update rule, eq. (6), is at work.
strategies of the well-mixed case (p > 0.5) are allowed to the high degree nodes of SF
networks, in the case of B players the unsuccessful region of strategies of the well-mixed
limit (p < 0.5) is always empty, regardless of the underlying topology of interactions.
3.3. Networks of type C players (independent p and q)
Finally, we explore the situation according to which players are allowed to choose their
offers p and acceptance thresholds q independently. In Figures 3.a and 3.b we plot the
distribution of offers D(p) for ER and SF networks respectively. Remarkably the two
distributions show a maximum around p ≃ 0.3, pointing out that offers are quite poor
in this third setting. In the case of ER, nearly all the offers are concentrated around the
maximum and time evolution shows that large offers dissapear first from the population,
similarly to the case of players A on ER networks. For SF networks D(p) is remarkably
broader having nonzero values for the entire range of p ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, only in
SF networks we observe some degree of altruistic behavior, although the probability of
finding offers with p > 0.5 is lower than that for p < 0.5.
Turning the attention to the distribution of acceptance thresholds D(q) (Figures
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Figure 4. Scatter plot of the individual stragies (pi, qi) in the asymtotic regime for
ER (a) and SF (b) networks. For the ER case we have plotted the agents strategies
{(pi, qi)} corresponding to 4 randomly chosen realizations, whereas for SF networks 8
realizations have been used. From the plots it is clear that in most cases pi > qi in
both topologies.
3.c and 3.d) we observe that both networks present quite similar behaviors since in
both, players accept low offers although they are still far from a fully rational behavior
(q = 0). In particular, for ER networks any offer above 0.4 will be accepted. In the case
of SF networks this global threshold is slightly larger although the probability of finding
acceptance thresholds with q > 0.5 is extremely low. Interestingly, in both distributions
we find that the probability of finding players with q = 0 is nonzero.
We have also checked what is the correlation, if any, between the values of p and
q chosen by the players in order to unveil whether there is a natural tendency towards
one of the two settings A (p = q) or B (p = 1 − q). In Figure 4 the two scatter
plots are realized by representing the set of individual strategies {(pi, qi)} observed in
the asymptotic state for several realizations of the UG dynamics. In both ER (Figure
4.a) and SF (Figure 4.b) networks one can observe that pi ≥ qi holds for most of the
populations. This tendency clearly indicates that players are neither of type A nor
of type B, although, given the low value of the average offer p ≃ 0.3, their behavior
resemble more that of players of type A.
3.4. Degree of Selection
From the scatter plots in Figure 4 we observe that the strategies in ER networks fill
more densely the unit square than in SF. This result points out that the selection of
strategies is larger for SF networks, i.e. the number of strategies that survive in SF
networks after Natural selection is remarkably lower than for homogeneous networks.
In Figure 5 we report the fraction of different strategies found in a population of
ER and SF networks once the dynamical equilibrium is reached. It is clear that in SF
networks selection acts stronger than in homogeneous populations since after selection
takes place only a few number of strategies remain. We have checked that this is due
The Ultimatum Game in Complex Networks 12
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Figure 5. Degree of selection, measured as the number of different asymptotic
strategies divided by N , for ER and SF networks in the three different settings: (A)
p = q, (B) p = 1− q and (C) p and q independent.
to the presence of hubs and their ability for replicating their strategies across their
surroundings (that usually involve a large fraction of the population). In particular, for
the cases of A and B players, we have already shown that a hub can play successfully
the UG with a well-mixed population using a broad range of p values; namely, in the
thermodynamic limit (kh →∞), we have ph ∈ [0, 1] for type A and ph ∈ [1/2, 1] for type
B. Any of these values of p, when replicated by the well-mixed population in the next
generations, increase the payoff difference between hubs and the rest of the individuals.
Therefore, the dynamics of the well-mixed population in contact with the hub is finally
frozen with the p value dictated by it. From Figure 5 it becomes clear that the same
happens for populations of C players. Note also that the fact that the number of different
strategies observed during the equilibrium of SF networks is smaller than that in ER
networks is not inconsistent with the fact that the distribution D(p) in SF displays long
tails since this distribution is constructed averaging over many different equilibria.
4. Social Penalty
In this section, we change the scenario for the selection rule of strategies focusing on
the application of the so-called “social penalty” after each round robin of the UG. Let
us remark that, with this evolutionary rule, in order to survive a player has to take
care not only of its payoff, but also of those of its neighbors, since the poorest player
of the network is replaced together with all its neighbors. Therefore, if an individual
exploits his neighborhood so that he takes a large stake of the total reward, he would
risk to be dropped out of the game as a result of one of his neighbors being that
with the lowest payoff in the population of players. Consequently, what drives the
evolution of the distribution of p values among the population is the balance between
the conflicting interests of earning more (to avoid being the poorest) and earning less
(to avoid being stigmatized). This conflict could, in principle, be solved in the case of
hubs in SF networks: being the most connected elements, hubs are topological favoured
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to accumulate a large payoff per round. Therefore a hub can afford large degrees of
altruism providing his neighbors with enough payoff to survive and, at the same time,
without any risk of being himself the poorest element of the population.
Notice that, at variance with Natural Selection, successful strategies do not replicate
but simply survive in the long term. Therefore, as the removed individuals are replaced
by new players with randomly chosen strategies the equilibrium is approached slower
than in networks driven by Natural Selection. The results presented below correspond
to the numerical simularions of the UG dynamics over times up to t = 107, and averaged
over at least 102 different realizations of the networks and initial conditions.
4.1. Networks of type A players (p = q)
In Figures 6.a and 6.c we show the evolution of the distributions of offers D(p) of type
A players at different times. In the case of ER networks (Figure 6.a) the distribution
is nearly flat (with slowly decreasing tails at both extremes), pointing out that any
strategy can survive in a population of type A players with homogeneous degree. On
the other hand, the case of SF networks (Figure 6.c) reveals a more selective population
since a large number of individuals offer a quantity around p ≃ 0.75. However, although
having a well defined maximum, it is evident that nearly all the offers can survive.
The maximum of SF networks can be explained by looking at the mean offer of
players with degree k:
〈p〉k =
∑
{i|ki=k}
pi
NP (k)
. (12)
Figure 6.e plots this quantity as a function of the degree k. It is evident from the
figure that those players with low connectivity (the largest part of the population in SF
networks) are the ones playing with the offers around p ≃ 0.75. On the other hand,
offers from high degree nodes are very low. This latter result points out that hubs are
far from being altruistic in the case of a population of type A players. Moreover, in the
case of a hub connected to a large number of low degree nodes, the offers from the hub
will be automatically rejected since ph is lower than those offered by the leaves. Besides,
since most of leaves offer p > 1/2 to the hub, it takes the largest part of the reward
in all its interactions with the leaves. Therefore, hubs exploit their neighboring leaves
in a population of type A players, thus contradicting the arguments about the need of
generosity from hubs when social penalty is at work.
4.2. Networks of type B players (p = 1− q)
In the case of type B players the stationary distribution of offers D(p) for ER and SF
networks are shown in Figures 6.b and 6.d respectively. Interestingly, both distributions
show the same average value for the offers 〈p〉 ≃ 0.5. Though of equal average value,
the distribution densities are strikingly different for both kind of networks. While for
ER networks D(p) is almost flat with slowly decreasing tails at both extremes (such as
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Figure 6. Distribution of offers D(p) for ER and SF networks in the cases p = q [(a)
and (c)] and p = 1− q [(b) and (d)] when a Social penalty is used as the update rule.
Panels (e) and (f) show the values of 〈p〉k as a function of k for the cases p = q and
p = 1− q in SF networks.
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in the case of type A players), it is bimodal for the SF network. The two local maxima
of D(p) in SF networks are placed at p ≃ 0.3 and p ≃ 1. In principle this result points
out the polarization of the population into altruistic and selfish individuals. Therefore,
the degree-heterogeneity of SF networks promotes a very different microscopic balance
of conflicting aims, as reflected in the bimodal D(p), with respect to the mostly uniform
density of strategies observed in near homogeneous networks (ER).
The answer of such bimodal distribution in SF networks can be obtained by looking
at Figure 6.f, that shows the dependence of 〈p〉k on the degree of the nodes. In this
case the mean offer is seen to increase with the degree, in agreement with the expected
behavior for high degree nodes in SF networks explained above. Moreover, the hubs of
the network display a complete altruistic behavior p→ 1. In this way, since the relation
between the offers of two players pi + pj ≥ 1 must hold in order to conclude a deal, low
degree nodes attached to hubs both achieve the former successful combination of offers
and maximize its reward by chosing low values of p.
It is possible to show that, within the context of a SF network of type B players,
hubs can afford full generosity without any risk. Let us define the ”interacting degree”
of node i, kinti , as the number of neighbors of i with whom it interacts successfully (i.e.
those satisfying pj+pi ≥ 1, the interacting neighborhood). If we consider a hub in a SF
network, kh ≫ 1, then under the assumption that p is distributed in its neighborhood
following the same distribution as in the whole network, we obtain:
kinth = kh
∫
1
1−ph
D(p) dp = kh (1− F (1− ph)) , (13)
where F is the (cumulative) distribution function of D(p). Under the same assumptions,
it follows that the payoff received by a hub is
Πh = kh [1− F (1− ph)]
[
(1− ph) +
∫
1
1−ph
p dF
]
, (14)
where the integral is the average of p in the ”interacting” neighborhood of the hub.
Provided that this average is larger than θb/kh, the limit when ph → 1 is
lim
ph→1
Πh > θb . (15)
If θb is an upper bound of miniΠi, then a hub will not have the minimum payoff even if
it offers the whole stake and accepts any offer. One can give a simple estimate for the
upper bound θb: For kmin = 2, the less connected nodes offering 0 and linked to two fully
generous neighbors will obtain 4. That is, we can assume θb ≤ 4, in the argument above.
In other words, if the average value of the hubs neighbors pave > θb/kh (which at most is
4/kh), hubs can give away almost the whole stake. In particular, in the thermodynamic
limit where kh diverges, they can offer p = 1. Therefore, hubs can afford full generosity.
Moreover, they minimize the risk of being stigmatized by adopting high values of p. In
other words, they not only can afford full generosity, but also better they do if they
want their neighbors safe.
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4.3. Networks of type C players (independent p and q)
We analyze now the case when the values of offers p and acceptance thresholds q are
independent. After having obtained quite different results in populations of type A and
type B players one of our aims here is to unveil whether any of these latter behaviors is
also observed when players are free to decide the relation between p and q. In Figure 7
we sketch the main results for ER and SF networks.
In the case of ER networks we show in Figures 7.a and 7.c the time evolution of the
distributions D(p) and D(q) respectively. It is interesting to follow the time evolution of
both distributions. While at t = 104 roughly all the offers and acceptance thresholds are
equally probable, for large enough times the two distributions become bimodal: First,
strategies having p < 0.25 and q > 0.75 are clearly favored, at the same time, both
distributions show a peak at low and high values of p and q respectively. Therefore, the
two distributions are slightly polarized towards high and low values of p and q.
In SF netwoks the situation is completely different. In Figures 7.b and 7.d we find
asymptotic distributions with a well-defined maximum at intermediate values of both p
and q. In particular the two maxima are placed at p ≃ 0.4 and q ≃ 0.6 pointing out that
population converges to an equilibrium where the mean offer is similar to those values
found in experiments whereas the acceptance threshold is larger than typically observed,
pointing out an idiosincratic behavior [29]. It is also interesting to report on the time
evolution of the two distributions. From the figure it is clear that at moderate times
t = 104 the population focus on low offers and high acceptance thresholds, a situation in
which a few deals can be concluded and thus the global payoff is minimum. At t = 105
the low p and high q regions are abandoned and the population tends to concentrate
around the maxima of the asymptotic distributions at t = 106 and then a large amount
of deals can be concluded.
Looking at the distributions of p and q across degree clases, 〈p〉k (Figure 7.e) and
〈q〉k (Figure 7.f), we see clearly that the population occupying the regions around the
maxima of both D(p) and D(q) are those players of low degree. Interestingly, in the case
of 〈p〉k there is a range, from intermediate to high degrees, where a constant average
offer 〈p〉k ≃ 0.5 is reached. Similarly, in the same range of degrees, the values of the
acceptance thresholds stabilize around 〈q〉k ≃ 0.2. The overall trends of both functions
are that 〈p〉k grows with the degree (similarly to what is found in SF networks of type B
players) whereas 〈q〉k decreases with k. This indicates that high degree nodes, suported
in their topological advantadge, accept the low offers from the leaves and offer a large
part of the stake to them, thus favouring their survival.
From figures 7.e and 7.f we can conclude a coarse-grained description of the
population: Individuals with high (low) values of p display low (high) acceptance
thresholds. Although this description is based on average values across degree classes it
is clear that the assumption p = q is no longer valid when players are allowd to chose
p and q freely. We have checked the true correlation between the individuals values
of pi and qi for ER and SF networks. In Figure 8 we show the set values of the pairs
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Figure 7. The distributions of offers D(p) [(a) and (b)] and thresholds of acceptance
D(q) [(c) and (d)] for ER [(a) and (c)] SF [(b) and (d)] networks when Social Penalty
is used as the update rule. Panels (e) and (f) show the values of 〈p〉k and 〈q〉k as a
function of k in SF networks.
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Figure 8. Scatter plot of the individual strategies (pi, qi) in the asyntotic regime for
ER (a) and SF (b) networks. For the both the ER and SF case we plot the population
of 104 randomly chosen realizations, In both topologies the most frequent combination
that emerges is pi = 1− qi, resembling the case of players of type B.
{(pi, qi)} obtained in the asymptotic regime. Surprisingly, the accumulation of points
along the curve p = 1 − q points out that social penalty promote the behavior as type
B players of large part of the population in both topologies. This result validates the
assumption made above about the two strategic groups in SF networks. Additionally,
the observed trend p = 1− q nicely explains the composition of the two peaks observed
in the distributions D(p) and D(q) in ER networks: the maximum corresponding to
large (low) offers is formed by the same individuals that form the maximum at low
(large) acceptance thresholds.
5. Discussion and Conclusions
We have studied the Ultimatum Game when the individulas play among them according
to a network of interactions. In the networks considered in this study individuals can
have an homogenous number of neighbors (Erdo¨s-Re`nyi graphs) or, on the contrary,
present a high degree of heterogeneity in the number of contacts (Scale-free networks).
From this perspective, we analyze how the existence of different connectivity classes in
scale-free networks affects the behavior of the system. The Ultimatum Game dynamics
has been studied under three different frameworks: (i) role distinguishing, or empathetic,
agents (players offer the same quantity they want to be offered), (ii) role ignoring, or
pragmatic, agents (players want to obtain the same amount both as responders and
proposers) and (iii) agents with independent values for offers and acceptance thresholds.
Besides, we have explored two different mechanisms for implementing the selection rule
at each generation, namely: (i) Natural Selection, according to which players replicate
the fittest agents, and (ii) Social Penalty, according to which, at each generation, the
poorest agent is removed together with his neighbors.
Within the context of Natural selection we have observed that the results derived
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Figure 9. The distributions of offers D(p) [(a) and (c)] and thresholds of acceptance
D(q) [(b) and (d)] for natural Selection [(a) and (b)] and Social Penalty [(c) and (d)]
settings on SF networks. The networks are generated using the model in [39] and p
and q are independent.
from well-mixed arguments for the case of role distinguishing and role ignoring
agents agree well with those obtained in degree homogeneous populations, where
the distributions of offers are quite focused around 50%. Instead, in the case of
heterogeneous networks, the presence of highly connected nodes change quantitatively
(not qualitatively) the distribution making it broader, since hubs can afford to make
nearly all possible offers. When agents are allowed to choose their offers and thresholds
of acceptance independently, offers tend to decrease in both Erdo¨s-Re`nyi and scale-free
graphs to the 40%. Surprisingly, thresholds of acceptance are remarkably low, although
they are still far from the rational economic behavior and almost any offer above the 30%
of the stake is accepted. Therefore altruistic punishment, understood as the rejection of
low offers, arises in the context of Natural selection regardless of the underlying topology.
Interestingly, the replication of fittest strategies provokes that the selection of
strategies in the asymptotic regime is remarkably high, especially in the case of scale-free
networks. This selection is explained in terms of the existence of hubs and their ability
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to obtain a large reward with a broad range of strategies and thus to dictate the final
behavior of the entire population.
When Social punishment is implemented the dynamical behavior of the system
changes radically. Within this selection rule agents have to take care not only about
their own benefit but also about the fitness of their neighbors. Within this context,
we have found two drastically different behaviors between empathetic and pragmatic
agents. In particular, for scale-free networks, low degree nodes and high degree nodes
display opposite behaviors in the two settings. On one hand, in a population of role
distinguishing agents, leaves are those proposing a large portion of the stake (above
50%) whereas hubs show low offers (below 20%). On the other hand, for role ignoring
agents the situation is the opposite, since large offers (nearly the 100%) come from hubs
while leaves display selfish behavior. It is therefore in this latter setting where true
altruistic behavior is observed. Note that altruism arises in a self-organized manner
with selection acting locally: highly connected agents optimize their chances to survive
by increasing their generosity, without risking to be the poorest in town.
Probably the most interesting result is obtained when, in the framework of Social
punishment, players can adapt their offers and acceptance thresholds independently.
Surprisingly, the dynamical equilibria of both homogeneous and heterogeneous networks
resemble to a large extent that of role ignoring agents. In particular we have shown that,
in SF network, the large degree nodes, although not displaying full altruism, offer a large
reward (more than 50%) to their neighbors and accept low offers (below 20%). On the
other hand, the opposite behavior is found in lowly connected players. We have further
confirmed that, in the long run, players adapt their strategies and converge to the setting
of role ignoring agents, the framework where full altruistic behavior is observed. Let us
remark that the abundance of highly generous individuals observed when Social Penalty
is at work does not arise due to reputation [36], nor costly individuals’ punishment [30],
but from a purely scale-free effect combined with a social enforcement of altruism.
Finally, we point out that a full and satisfactory understanding of the models
exposed here may likely demand to study the dependence on other important topological
features (such as the clustering coefficient, degree-degree correlations, etc) or to
incorporate the competition between different kinds of individuals (role-ignoring and
role-distinguishing) into the model formulation. In particular, we have explored how
our results change when the underlying SF networks have a non-vanishing clustering
coefficient when p and q are independent (type C players). This is not an easy issue, as
one should first construct networks with a tunable clustering coefficient while keeping
the rest of topological properties unaltered. The model proposed in [39] can be used
to such an study as it generates scale-free networks with varying clustering properties
but leaving the rest of topological features roughly the same. Our results indicate that
no general conclusion can be reached as the effects of the clustering depend on several
factors, of both topological and dynamical nature. As shown in Fig. 9, in the case of
natural selection, the distribution D(q) does not change when the clustering coefficient
of the networks is increased from 0 to 0.7, while D(p) changes if the clustering coefficient
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exceeds 0.2 in such a way that the average offer increases. On the contrary, for the social
penalty setting, D(p) remains roughly unaltered whatever the clustering of the network
is, whereas D(q) deviates from its behavior for non-clustered networks as soon as the
clustering coefficient is increased leading to a distribution with a peak at very high
acceptance thresholds. All these are aspects to further explore in future works.
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